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Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in
which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form
of emission allowances and baseline-and-credit, in which ﬁrms
earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their base-
lines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria
of the two plans will diﬀer if baselines are proportional to output,
because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. To
test this prediction we have developed a computerized environ-
ment in which subjects representing ﬁrms can adjust both their
emission rates (per unit output) and capacity levels. Subjects
buy or sell emission rights (allowances or credits) in a sealed bid
call auction. The demand for output is simulated. All decisions
are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. This
environment is to be used to compare short and long run re-
sponses to the alternative trading methods. Initial experiments
in this environment will alternately hold emission rate and capac-
ity choice constant. We report on six experimental sessions with
variable emissions rates but ﬁxed capacity and two pilot sessions
with variable capacity but ﬁxed emission rates.
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This paper reports on a long term research project on “Implications
of Alternative Emission Trading Plans”. Emissions trading is a method
of assigning and trading the right to emit pollution so that the cost of
pollution abatement is minimized. There are two basic methods of im-
plementing emissions trading: cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit.
When production capacity is ﬁxed these approaches should lead to
identical results, but when ﬁrms can adjust capacity, output under a
baseline-and-credit system is predicted to be higher than in a cap-and-
trade system. We are trying to test this prediction experimentally.
There is a relatively long history of laboratoy experimentation related
to emissions trading, summarized in Muller and Mestelman (1998) and
Bohm (2003). Recent papers include Cason and Gangadharan (2004),
Murphy and Stranlund (2004) and Kusakawa and Saijo (2003). Most
of these papers have abstracted from production decisions. Ben-David,
Brookshire, Burness, McKee and Schmidt (1999) investigate techno-
logical choice in emissions trading, but hold output ﬁxed. No previous
published experiments have have focused on long-run adjustment of
capacity in emissions trading markets.
In this paper we provide some brief background on alternative ap-
proaches to emissions trading and quickly review the theoretical basis
for our predictions. We then present the experimental environment
that we have designed, stressing the organization and sequencing of
the various markets and the design of the computer program we have
written. The present paper provides an overview of the program and
highlights of early results. Fuller details are reported in Buckley, Muller
and Mestelman (2003) and Buckley (2004). It turns out that the en-
vironment we have created is quite complex and we are implementingBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 2
it step by step. We will review three sets of results we have obtained.
The ﬁrst is a set of simulated sessions using robot traders, which we
used to test our program. The second is a recently completed experi-
ment involving human subjects. It compares the two trading systems
in the short run, when their outcomes should be identical. Finally, we
will report long-run results from two pilot sessions in which capacity is
variable.
1 Alternative Emission Trading Plans
Cap-and-trade is the textbook approach to emissions trading. It is best
exempliﬁed by the highly successful SO2 trading program introduced
by the US EPA in the mid-90s. In this approach, a ﬁxed cap is placed
on the aggregate emissions of a group of ﬁrms. The cap is divided
into emission permits or allowances which are distributed or sold to
the participating ﬁrms. Firms surrender one allowance for each unit of
waste discharged. Unused allowances can be sold or banked for future
use. Firms whose emissions exceed their holdings of allowances must
buy more on the open market.
Many ﬁeld implementations of emissions trading take a diﬀerent
approach. An example is the clean development mechanism proposed
under the Kyoto Protocol. In these baseline-and-credit plans there is
no concept of cap on aggregate emissions. Instead, each ﬁrm has the
right to emit a certain baseline level of emissions. This baseline may
be derived from historical emissions or from a performance standard
that speciﬁes the permitted ratio of emissions to output. Firms create
emission reduction credits by emitting less than their baseline emis-
sions. These credits may be banked or sold to ﬁrms who exceed theirBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 3
baselines.
Baseline-and-credit plans diﬀer from cap-and-trade in a number of
institutional details. For example, most baseline-and-credit plans are
project based: credits are generated by speciﬁc projects which reduce
emissions below predicted levels. Usually, the emission reductions must
be actually realized before the credits can be registered and made avail-
able for trading. These and other features cause higher administrative
costs. More importantly for our purposes, baseline-and-credit plans
must specify a baseline for each ﬁrm. Although this could be a ﬁxed
amount, comparable to the distribution of allowances in a cap-and-
trade plan, often the baseline is computed by mulitplying output or
some other measure of scale by a performance standard in the form of
a maximum rate of emissions per unit of output.
Under a variable baseline plan a ﬁrm can increase its baseline emis-
sions simply by increasing output. This creates an implict subsidy
which reduces the long run marginal cost of output. As a result, equi-
librium output and emissions are predicted to be higher under baseline-
and-credit than under cap-and-trade.
2 Theoretical Analysis
The prediction of higher output and emissions under a baseline-and-
credit plan emerges very directly in a simpliﬁed version of our model.
In this simpliﬁed version we assume output is always equal to capacity
and that the regulator has set the performance standard under baseline-
and-credit equal to the average emission rate for the industry under
the optimal cap-and-trade plan. Under a cap-and-trade plan, each
ﬁrm receives a ﬁxed number of allowances, Ai. The ﬁrm’s problemBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 4
is to choose output, qi, and emission rate, ri, so as to maximize its
proﬁt. Proﬁt is equal to the sales revenue P(Q)qi (where Q is industry
output) less capacity costs, ciqi, variable costs, wiqi, and allowance
costs. Allowance costs equal the price of allowances, Pa, times the
net demand for allowances (riqi − Ai). This net demand is equal to





i = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pa(riqi − Ai) (1)
Under a baseline-and-credit plan the ﬁrm’s problem is almost iden-
tical. The only diﬀerence is in the last term, the cost of credits. Credit
costs are equal to the price of credits Pc times the net demand for
credits but in this case the net demand for credits is equal to the ac-
tual emission rate minus the performance standard, rs, multiplied by




i = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pcqi(ri − rs) (2)
The diﬀerence in objective functions is reﬂected in the ﬁrst order
conditions. There are two: one for emission rates and one for output.




i ) = Pa (3)
−c0
i(rc
i) = Pc (4)Buckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 5
Equations (3) and (4) are identical. They require that marginal
abatement cost equal the price of allowances or credits.
The ﬁrst order conditions on output are (5) and (6) where Qa and
Qc are industry output under cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit
respectively.
P(Qa) = ci(ra
i ) + wi + ra
i Pa (5)
P(Qc) = ci(rc
i) + wi + riPc − rsPc (6)
Both conditions require that price of output equal the long run
marginal cost. In the case of cap-and-trade long run marginal cost
equals unit capacity cost, ci, plus unit variable cost, wi, plus the unit
allowance cost, riPa. In the baseline and credit case there is a fourth
term, rsPc, which is the value of the credits displaced by the marginal
increase in the ﬁrm’s baseline. This term reduces long run marginal cost
in the same way that a subsidy would do and consequently equilibrium
output will be greater than in the case of cap-and-trade.
Note that in the cap-and-trade case private marginal cost is equal to
social marginal cost because the private opportunity cost of allowances,
Pa, is equal to the marginal damage cost whereas in the cap-and-trade
case private marginal cost is below social marginal cost.
The long run competitive equilbrium can be illustrated by two in-
terdependent diagrams (see Figure 1). Panel (a) depicts the aggregate
emissions market. The demand for emissions is given by the aggregate
marginal abatement cost curve. The social opportunity cost of emis-
sions is given by the marginal damage curve, MD. The intersection of
MD and MAC determines the optimal quantity of emissions, E∗. ThisBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 6
Figure 1: Long Run Competitive Equilibrium
intersection also determines the market clearing price for allowances if
the socially optimal quantity of E∗ allowances is created.
Panel (b) depicts the market for output. (It is assumed all ﬁrms are
competitors in the downstream market.) The long run marginal cost
curves (LACa and LACc for baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade re-
spectively) are both horizontal. Under a cap-and-trade plan equilib-
rium output is determined by the intersection of LACa and the demand
curve at the social optimum, Q∗. Under a baseline-and-credit plan out-
put Qc is determined by the intersection of the demand curve with the
lower, private marginal cost curve LACc. Clearly Qc > Q∗
Note that the ratio of E∗ to Q∗ determines a unique emission rate,
rs ≡ E∗/Q∗, which we may call the optimal performance standard.
Since the average emission rate under baseline-and-credit is equal to
that under cap-and-trade, Qc > Q∗ implies that emissions will also be
greater under baseline-and-credit than they are under cap-and-trade.
Thus we have two key theoretical propositions.
Proposition 1 Long run competitive equilibrium emissions and outputBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 7
are socially optimal under a cap-and-trade plan, provided the supply of
allowances equals the socially optimal quantity of emissions.
Proposition 2 In long run competitive equilibrium, aggregate emis-
sions and aggregate output under a baseline-and-credit plan are higher
than the long run equilibrium levels of a cap-and-trade plan with the
same aggregate emission rate.
3 The Experimental Environment
We wish to test these propositions in a fully speciﬁed market envi-
ronment. This is diﬃcult, because it requires achieving equilibrium in
two interrelated markets: the market for emission rights (allowances or
credits) and the market for output. Consequently our subjects must
make both a technological decision (on emission rate) and an output-
determining decision (on capacity or output) each period. Such detail
is rare in emission trading experiments. Only one published emission
rate experiment (Ben-David et al. 1999) has included an explicit tech-
nological decision on emission rate and that experiment held the output
of each subject constant. We also wish to capture the distinction be-
tween short-run production and long-run capacity decisions, although
we have not fully implemented this feature in our experiments. Finally
we wish to create a vehicle that can actually demonstrate the diﬀerence
in plans to policy-makers and practicioners.
These considerations led us to develop a computerized environment
in which subjects trade emission rights and sell output in multiple-unit
uniform-price call markets. Demand in the output market is simulated.
Due to the complexity of the environment and our desire to create a
vehicle that could be used for training, we chose to use context-relatedBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 8
rather than neutral language. Thus we explicitly use terms such as
allowance and credit rather than abstract terms such as coupon.
We implemented our computerized environment with a fully spec-
iﬁed accounting framework in which every action gives rise to both a
debit and a credit. As a result we can provide subjects with a complete
income statement at the end of each period.
The program operates as follows. At repeated intervals during the
experiment subjects have the ability to choose their production capac-
ity. Capacity may have a life of one or more periods. Subjects build
capacity at the beginning of each period in which capacity adjustments
are permitted. Following this subjects receive their periodic allotments
of allowances if it is a cap-and-trade experiment. Otherwise they enter
the emissions trading market with any credits they produced in the
previous period. Then they may attempt to buy or sell more emission
rights by entering up to three bids and three asks in a multiple-unit
uniform-price auction. By emission rights we mean either allowances
or credits as the case may be. Each bid or ask is a speciﬁes both a
price and quantity of rights demanded or oﬀered at that price. After
all bids and asks are received the market for emissions rights clears.
Subjects then choose an emission rate which will be applied to their
output for the period. Then they submit asks to the output market,
which is a multiple-unit uniform-price market with simulated demand.
Asks are constrained by available capacity and by the subject’s in-
ventory of emission rights. When the output market clears, subjects
automatically produce the quantity sold and redeem the required num-
ber of rights. Finally, under baseline-and-credit treatments, subjects
are credited with any credits they may have created by producing out-Buckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 9
put with an emission rate below the performance standard. We then
repeat the procedure. Algorithm 1 summarizes the process.
Algorithm 1 Sequence of Events
for each period in the session
choose capacity if permitted
receive allowances if cap-and-trade
submit bids or asks to emissions right market
wait until the emissions rights market clears
choose emission rate
submit asks to output market
wait until output market clears
produce number of units sold in the output market
redeem emissions rights
create credits if baseline-and-credit
bank excess rights;
Demand is simulated by a linear demand function. Unit capacity
cost depends inversely on emission rates. We chose a functional form
that would allow us to directly determine the minimum unit cost, u0,
the maximum unit cost, u1, and the curvature of the marginal cost
curve, α.




We convert the marginal cost curve into a step function by restrict-
ing r to integer values.
There are four types of ﬁrm ranging from dirtiest, with lowest u0 but
highest u1, to cleanest, with highest u0 and lowest u1. Our experiments
have been set up for eight subjects, two for each type of ﬁrm.
4 Robot Traders
We tested our model by programming clients to act as robot traders.
Our primary interest was to determine whether the environment wasBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 10
Firm Type u1 u0 α wi r∗
i Ai rs
A-cleanest 76 65 3 0 0 2 1
B-cleaner 89 59 3 0 1 4 1
C-dirty 90 59 3 0 2 4 1
D-dirtiest 269 52 3 0 3 2 1
Table 1: Cost Parameters for Robot Traders
Trading
Insitution Uncontrolled B&C C&T
Price of
Emission Rights 0 8 8
Price of
Output 52 68 76
Aggregate
Output 48 32 24
Aggregate
Emissions 144 32 24
Active Firm
Types D all all
B&C - baseline-and-credit
C&T - cap-and-trade
Table 2: Predictions for Robot Traders
stable under reasonable assumptions about subjects’ behaviour.
The robots were programmed to bid myopically and non-strategically.
That is, they attempted to maximimze their short run proﬁts at every
decision point. However we did introduce a random error into their
bidding decisions. Earlier simulations had become unstable when no
restrictions were placed on the timing and size of capacity purchases.
Consequently, for this experiment we imposed a capacity life of 8 peri-
ods. Capacity decisions were staggered, with one robot choosing new
capacity each period. For the robot simulations we limited emission
rate choices to the four integer levels between 0 and 3. The parametersBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 11
and predicted outcomes are reported in Tables 1 and 2. We ran six
simulations, with two institutional treatments (baseline-and-credit and
cap-and-trade) and three levels of error in the bidding process (coeﬃ-
cients of variation of 0, 5% and 15%).
The results of some of these simulations are shown in Figures 2 to
5. Figure 2 shows the simulated adjustment when the robot baseline-
and-credit traders begin with capacity and past prices consistent with
the long-run cap-and-trade equilibrium. In this simulation there are
no errors in the bidding process. The top left hand corner shows the
evolution of output and capacity. Our key prediction concerning ca-
pacity is borne out. Capacity rises steadily from the cap-and-trade
equilibrium of 24, overshoots the baseline-and-credit equilibrium of 32,
then smoothly converges to the predicted level. Actual output is be-
low capacity in a number of cases. These represent cases in which the
robot traders were unsuccessful in obtaining suﬃcent credits to cover
the output at full capacity and the chosen emission rate. The top right
quadrant shows aggregate emissions. These oscillate widely over the
ﬁrst few periods and then settle down at equilibrium values.
The bottom left-hand quadrant shows the evolution of credit prices.
After a sharp initial rise the credit price settles quickly back to the
equilibrium level of 8. The bottom right-hand quadrant illustrates
the emission rate chosen by each class of ﬁrm. All ﬁrms respond to
the high initial price of credits by reducing their emission rates. This
adjustment is promptly reversed when the price of credits falls. Figure
2 thus conﬁrms that short-run myopic proﬁt maximization will quickly
lead to the predicted eﬀects of the baseline-and-credit plan.
Figure 3 shows a simulated session when traders make larger errorsBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 12
in bidding. In these simulations the robot traders made bids equal
to their optimal short-run proﬁt maximizing bid plus a normally dis-
tributed error with coeﬃcient of variation equal to 15% of the optimal
bid. The quadrants of Figure 3 are laid out like those of Figure 2. The
simulated results conﬁrm our fundamental proposition, that baseline-
and-credit trading will lead to an expansion of capacity relative to
cap-and-trade. Capacity expansion is relatively steady, while output is
marked by intermittent shortages caused by a failure to obtain suﬃ-
cient credits on the market. The price of credits is generally close to
equilibrium, but subject to signiﬁcant price spikes. Emissions ﬂuctuate
wildly as emisison rates oscillate in response to credit prices.
Figure 4 shows a simulation of the cap-and-trade mechanism. In
this simulation ﬁrms are started in the baseline-and-credit equilibrium
and subjected to cap-and-trade rules. The prediction is that output
and capacity should contract. In this no-error simulation, the price of
allowances is remarkably stable, capacity declines smoothly, while out-
put and emissions exhibit somewhat higher oscillations than in Figure
2. Figure 4 shows the same experiment with high bidding errors (co-
eﬃcient of variation equal to 15% of the optimal bid). Once again we
see relatively stable allowance prices, relatively smooth convergence of

























































































































































































Figure 5: Credit to Allowance Equilibrium, Robot Traders, High ErrorsBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 17
Summary of Robot Trader Sessions
Our simulations with robot traders led to several conclusions which
were helpful in designing our ﬁrst sessions with human subjects.
First we discovered that the system became unstable when all robots
could choose any level of capacity they wished. This was the motiva-
tion for staggering capacity expiry dates and constraining step sizes to
unity.
Second, we discovered that the constrained system tracks the pre-
dicted output and capacity paths quite closely. It is true that out-
put falls below capacity on a number of occasions. These occur when
traders are unable to acquire suﬃcient emissions rights to produce at
capacity.
Thirdly, errors in bidding generated large ﬂuctuations in emission
rates and total emissions. These ﬂuctuations seemed largest in the
baseline-and-credit simulations.
Finally, we determined that both the relative stability and high
price spikes for emission rights were caused by a small number of large
steps in the marginal abatement cost schedules. This lead us to modify
the parameters for the ﬁxed capacity sessions.
5 Fixed Capacity Sessions
The sessions with robot traders convinced us that we should proceed
cautiously in experimenting with human subjects. Our general struc-
ture required subjects to optimize on 3 margins: the choice of output,
choice of emission rate and the choice of capacity. When capacity is
ﬁxed, the outcome of baseline and credit trading should be identical toBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 18
Firm Type u0 u1 α wi r∗
i Ai rs ki
A-cleanest 88 172 3 0 2 20 5 4
B-cleaner 64 249 3 0 4 20 5 4
C-dirty 52 375 3 0 6 20 5 4
D-dirtiest 29 1852 3 0 8 20 5 4
Table 3: Fixed Capacity Sessions - Cost Paramters
the outcome under cap-and-trade. We decided to test this prediction
in our environment by running 3 cap-and-trade sessions and 3 baseline-
and-credit sessions holding capacity ﬁxed at 4 units per subject. To
obtain a smaller equilibrium price tunnel we increased the number of
emission rate steps to 10 (zero to nine).
After several pilot sessions indicated that the subjects were still
ﬁnding the environment hard to understand we further simpliﬁed their
task by automating the output decisions. Short run myopic proﬁt max-
imization will lead subjects to oﬀer their maximum output at a reser-
vation price of zero, so we imposed this decision automatically.
We computed a set of parameters that would leave all types of
ﬁrm operating in long run competitive equilibrium (see Table 3). The
inverse demand curve for output was P = 320 − 5Q . All ﬁrms receive
4 units of capacity(ki). The performance standard (rs) is 5 tons of
waste per ton of output. The equivalent endowment of allowances (Ai)
is 20. Variable costs (wi) are set equal to zero. Under uncontrolled
conditions the dirtiest ﬁrms have lowest ﬁxed cost per unit of capacity
(u0 = 29), and the cleanest ﬁrms the highest, 88. Under maximum
control (ri = 0) the cleanest ﬁrms have the lowest costs(u1 = 172)
while the dirtiest have the highest (1852).
These parameters give rise to the four marginal abatment costBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 19
Figure 6: Marginal Abatement Costs
curves illustrated in Figure 6. The ”dirty” ﬁrms have the steepest
MAC curves, the ”cleanest” the ﬂattest. The equilibrium MAC of 16
is indicated by the horizontal line. In equilibrium the cleanest ﬁrms
choose an emission rate of 2 while the dirtest choose 8. The remaining
equilibrium predictions are reported in Table 4
As mentioned previously, under conditions of ﬁxed capacity the
equilibrium outcomes are the same in both treatments and both are
equal to the social optimum provided marginal damage is 16. The
price of emission rights is 16, output price is 160, aggregate output is
32, aggregate emissions are 5 times 32 or 160 and all ﬁrms have equal
average costs in equilibrium.
We ran six sessions with untrained subjects. Figure 7 shows the
mean price of emission rights by treatment, as indicated by the blackBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 20
Trading Insitution B&C C&T
Price of Emisson Rights 16 16
Price of Output 160 160
Aggregate Output 32 32
Aggregate Emissions 160 160




Table 4: Fixed Capacity Predictions
dots. The shaded area spans the minimum and maximum observations
for each period. It is immediately obvious that there are some system-
atic treatment eﬀects. Under cap-and-trade prices are tightly clustered
in a narrow band at or below the equilibrium band. There seems to be a
clear downward trend across periods. Under baseline-and-credit prices
are generally higher and much more variable, especially in the earlier
periods of the session. Mean prices fall over the course of the session
but are generally above the cap-and-trade prices for the comparable
periods.
Figure 8 illustrates aggregate output by period. Recall that output
can fall below equilibrium if ﬁrms fail to obtain suﬃcient credits or al-
lowances to cover their emissions. Once again mean values are ndicated
by black dots and the shaded area contains the range of the observa-
tions. Under cap-and-trade output is quite variable but systematically
below the competitive equilibrium. Under baseline-and-credit output
is closer to the competitive equilibrium, although still generally below
it.
Despite the diﬀerences in output, aggregate emissions seem veryBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 21
Figure 7: Fixed Capacity - Permit Prices
Figure 8: Fixed Capacity - Aggregate OutputBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 22
Figure 9: Fixed Capacity - Aggregate Emissions
similar under both treatments. There is a general upward trend in
mean emissions. The emissions trend shown in Figure 9 reﬂects the
behaviour of inventories over the course of each session. Under com-
petitive conditions there is no need for ﬁrms to maintain inventories
of emission rights. Perhaps surprisingly, every session demonstrated
a substantial accumulation of emission rights inventories over the ﬁrst
ﬁve periods. Subjects began to work these oﬀ in the second half of the
experiment.
Summary of Fixed Capacity Sessions
Simple statistics conﬁrm the general impressions from the graphs. Ta-
ble 5 presents means computed over periods 6 through 9. This avoids
the learning and convergence eﬀects observable in the early periodsBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 23
C&T B&C Prediction Signif.
Permits
Price** 8.42 18.92 16.00 c
Volume* 24.25 17.08 32.00 cb
Output
Price* 172.08 163.33 160.00 c
Volume* 29.58 31.33 32.00 c
Emissions 171.00 171.58 160.00
Inventory 59.00 48.00 0.00 cb
Eﬃciency 0.95 0.96 1.00 cb
B&C - baseline-and-credit
C&T - cap-and-trade
* - Treatment signﬁcant at 10%, N=6
** - Treatment signﬁcant at 5%, N=6
b - B&C signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from prediction at 5%
c - C&T signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from prediction at 5%
Table 5: Means by Treatment - Periods 6 to 9
and the possibility of end-game eﬀects in period 10. Although there
are only six observations it is possible to conduct parametric tests on
the diﬀerence between treatment means and of the diﬀerence between
the observed means for each treatment and the competitive prediction.
We have also conducted non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests on these
observations, with essentially the same results.
Examining the ﬁrst row we see that predicted price of permits was
16. The mean price under baseline-and-credit was 18.92 compared to
8.42 under cap-and-trade. The diﬀerence between treatments is signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level and the cap-and-trade observations are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the competitive equilibrium prediction of 16.
The volume of rights traded is slightly higher under cap-and-trade
than under baseline-and-credit. The diﬀerence in means is signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. Both cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit meansBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 24
are signiﬁcantly below the predicted volume of 32.
Output volume is slightly lower and output price is slightly higher
in cap-and-trade than in baseline-and-credit and the cap-and-trade val-
ues are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the predicted values of 32 and 160
respectively. On the other hand, aggregate emissions in the two plans
are virtually equal. This implies a higher aggregate emission rate in
the cap-and-trade plan. Inventories are higher in cap-and-trade than
in baseline-and-credit, but in this case the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
Eﬃciency, as measured by the sum of producer and consumer surplus,
is essentially the same under both plans.
Summary of Fixed Capacity Results
We predicted that in this restricted environment there would be no dif-
ference between cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit outcomes. Not
surpisingingly, we found that both treatments deviated mildly from
the predictions. Both exhibited some ineﬃcient accumulation of per-
mit inventories, below predicted volumes of trade and slightly lower
product volumes. Somewhat surprisingly, we found some signiﬁcant
treament eﬀects. In particular, cap-and-trade exhibits higher permit
volumes and lower permit prices than baseline and credit. It also ex-
hibits lower product volumes and higher product prices. All of these
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. On the other hand, there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in aggregate emissions nor in private eﬃciency.
Private eﬃciency is quite high, with no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect and
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence from the optimal level.Buckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 25
6 Variable Capacity
The last results we report here concern two pilot sessions for our next
experiment. This is our ﬁrst attempt to test the prediction that out-
put and capacity will be higher under baseline-and-credit trading. In
order to get as clear a reading as possible on this issue, we resolved to
consider the case in which production capacity adjusts while emission
rates remain constant. We used the same cost parameters as used in
the ﬁxed capacity experiment. We decided to start all subjects oﬀ in
the cap-and-trade equilibrium from the ﬁxed capacity experiments.
Because of the implicit subsidy on output created by the variable
baseline we expect that subjects will expand aggregate capacity in the
baseline-and-credit sessions while aggregate capacity under cap-and-
trade should remain reatively constant. In both cases, however, the
capacity of dirty ﬁrms should shrink and the capacity of cleaner ﬁrms
should rise during the experiment. In order to prevent destabilizing
adjustments we restrict changes in capacity to one unit per period.
The output market is automated, as before.
We have run two pilot sessions for this experiment. We will compare
the results to simulated results from myopic, proﬁt maximizing robots.
We have only begun to analyse the data from these sessions. Figure
6 graphs aggregate output in the two sessions. The large dots are
the observed values. The smaller dots are simultated data from robot
traders.
Consider ﬁrst the simulated values. Under cap-and-trade there is
a mild oscillation in volume as cleaner ﬁrms expand and dirtier ﬁrms
contract. The observed values start below the predicted levels, pre-Buckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 26
Figure 10: Variable Capacity Pilot Sessions Output Volumes
sumably because some ﬁrms were unable to obtain the allowances they
required, given their capacity. Nevertheless, the pattern conforms quite
closely to the predictions.
Under baseline-and-credit the predicted path is a gradual increase
in output and capacity for all ﬁrms until product price is forced down
suﬃciently to drive some of the high cost ﬁrms out of the market. The
actual path starts well below the predicted level but does rise over
time. Unfortunately, the session ended early because of a computer
malfunction.
It is too early to draw ﬁrm conclusions from these results. The one
regularity seems to be that human subjects consistently produce less
output than our robots do. The upward trend in output in the second
session gives some hope that we will observe the predicted increase inBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 27
capacity under baseline-and-credit.
7 Conclusion
This paper has reported our progress in developing a laboratory envi-
ronment to examine long-run behaviour of alternative emission trad-
ing plans. In particular we wish to test the prediction that capacity,
emissions and output will be higher under variable baseline-and-credit
trading than under cap-and-trade. We have successfully developed an
operational computerized environment suitable for short- and long-run
experiments in emission trading. Simulations conducted in this envi-
ronment suggest that there may be some diﬃculy in achieving a stable
market equilibrium. Nevertheless, robot trades achieve the equilibria
predicted by competitive theory. Experiments with human subjects
and ﬁxed capacity suggest there are some unanticipated diﬀerences
between baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade plans, even when the
predicted short-run equilibrium is the same for both. Finally, our vari-
able capacity pilot sessions demonstrate that experiments with variable
capacity are feasible, and, with a generous eye, suggest that ﬁrms may
be responding to the subsidy inherent in baseline and credit trading.
We will be continuing this work by running six variable capacity
sessions this summer. By the fall we hope to progress to sessions in
which allow adjustment at both margins: emission rate and capacity.
That should be suﬃcient to provide at least provisional evidence on
the long run diﬀerences in the performance of baseline and credit and
cap and trade systems.
The environment we have created lends itself to a number of further
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First would be to testbed the performance of credit-for-early action
plans. These plans allow ﬁrms to earn credit for emissions reduction
below a baseline which is not yet mandatory. The issue is whether this
would encourage reductions in emissions that would not otherwise take
place.
A second area for work lies in the impact of alternative accounting
rules on the behaviour of subjects in these environments. There is no
ﬁrm agreement on how the distribution of allowances should be treated.
In our experiment they have been entered into ﬁrm’s inventories at
estimated market value. This, however, has the result of raising a
ﬁrm’s income above its cash ﬂow when the allowances are received and
reducing income below cash ﬂow when sold at a loss. It is entirely
possible that production decisions could be aﬀected by changing the
reporting method.
Finally, variable baseline and credit plans are most commonly pro-
posed in a hybrid form, where the credits generated by the uncapped
ﬁrms are sold to ﬁrms in a capped sector (Fischer 2001). Our environ-
ment should be ideal for investigating the behavioural implications of
such arrangements.
References
Ben-David, S., Brookshire, D. S., Burness, S., McKee, M. and
Schmidt, C.: 1999, Heterogeneity, irreversible production choices,
and eﬃciency in emission permit markets, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 38, 176–194.
Bohm, P.: 2003, Experimental evaluations of policy instruments, inBuckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 29
K.-G. M¨ aler and J. Vincent (eds), Handbook of Environmental
Economics, Vol. 1 of Handbooks in Economics, Elsevier.
Buckley, N. J.: 2004, Short-run implications of cap-and-trade versus
baseline-and-credit emission trading plans: Experimental evidence,
manuscript, McMaster University Department of Economics.
URL: http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/∼econ/mceel/
research.htm#unpublished
Buckley, N. J., Muller, R. A. and Mestelman, S.: 2003, Long-run
implications of alternative emission trading plans: An experiment
with robot traders. McMaster University Department of Economics
Working Paper 2003-04.
Cason, T. N. and Gangadharan, L.: 2004, Emissions variability in
tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking,
manuscript, Purdue University.
Fischer, C.: 2001, Rebating environmental policy revenues:
Output-based allocations and tradable performance standards,
Discussion Paper 01-22, Resources for the Future.
Kusakawa, T. and Saijo, T.: 2003, Emissions trading experiments:
Investment uncertainty and liability, manuscript, Osaka University,
Graduate School of Economics. Presentation to the International
Conference on Experimental Methods in Economics and Finance,
City University of Hong Kong, 2-3 June 2004.
Muller, R. A. and Mestelman, S.: 1998, What have we learned from
emissions trading experiments?, Managerial and Decision
Economics .
Murphy, J. J. and Stranlund, J.: 2004, Direct and market eﬀects of
enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis,Buckley et.al. Alternative Emission Trading Plans 30
Amherst Resource Economics Working Paper 2004-5, University of
Massachusetts.
URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=536722